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Abstract
Central bank behavior is often summarized by simple rules for operat-
ing targets, i.e., for a short-run nominal interest rate or for a money
growth rate. In this paper we examine conditions under which these
rules lead to identical fundamental solutions of a conventional business
cycle model. When prices are ‡exible, forward looking interest rate rules
can be equivalent to money growth policy. In particular, the consump-
tion Euler equation implies that constant money growth is equivalent
to a passive interest rate regime, while an active interest rate rule cor-
responds to an accommodating money growth policy. When prices are
sticky, equivalence further requires either interest rate policy or house-
holds’ behavior to be history dependent. However, a central bank, which
controls the money growth rate, cannot implement a sequence of nominal
interest rates satisfying Taylor’s (1993) rule on a saddle stable equilib-
rium path.
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Changes in the monetary policy stance are today often announced in terms of a short-run
nominal interest rate; the latter serving as an operating target, when a central bank adjusts
the supply of reserves, e.g., via open market operations. Correspondingly, growing interest
h a se m e r g e di nt h er e c e n tp a s to nt h ea b i l i t yo fs i m p l ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l e st os u m m a r i z et h e
behavior of central banks, as, for example, demonstrated by Taylor (1993) or Clarida et al.
(2000). On the other hand, it has been argued that the central bank actually controls the
growth rate of a narrow monetary aggregate (see, e.g., Eichenbaum, 1992). According to
this view, monetary policy might as well be summarized by an exogenous money growth
rule as recently shown by Christiano et al. (2001) and presumed in various contributions to
the monetary business cycle literature. This raises the question of how money growth and
interest rates are actually related and if simple rules for both can be used interchangeably.
Taylor (1999), for example, suggests interest rate rules as ’a good description of monetary
policy in a …xed money growth regime’, whereas simulation results point to substantial
di¤erences between these monetary policy procedures in a standard business cycle model
(see, e.g., Galí, 2002).
In this paper we aim at deriving conditions for interest rate and money growth rules
to lead to identical allocations in the consensus monetary business cycle framework, which
is known as the New Neoclassical Synthesis or the New Keynesian model.2 In particu-
lar, for monetary policy rules to be equivalent we claim that they have to implement the
same fundamental solution, also known as the bubble-free solution, for the perfect foresight
equilibrium.3 Focussing on the structural part of monetary policy, our analysis thus com-
plements the research on monetary policy shock e¤ects, in particular, on liquidity e¤ects of
monetary injections (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 1997, or, Andrés et al., 2002). Comparable
studies, which relate money growth to interest rate policy, depart from our approach by
either employing di¤erent theoretical frameworks, such as Monnet and Weber (2001) using
a segmented market model with ‡exible prices or Vegh (2001) applying a continuous time
framework with sticky in‡ation, or by focussing on implied structural relations instead of
reduced form solutions (see Minford et al., 2002).4
In the consensus model the so-called forward looking IS-curve, which stems from the
consumption Euler equation, governs the relation between the money growth rate and the
nominal interest rate. It predicts that consumption grows with a rise in the real interest
rate. When demand for real balances is positively related to consumption, a higher real
interest rate induces, ceteris paribus, real balances to grow. Given that the model exhibits
2For a discussion of this framework see Goodfriend and King (1997) and Clarida et al. (1999).
3To facilitate the comparison, money growth rates are set contingent on the in‡ation rate.
4A comparative welfare analysis of simple money growth and interest rate rules in a ‡exible price frame-
work can be found in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995).
1no endogenous dynamics for ‡exible prices such that the bubble-free equilibrium path is
identical with the steady state, equivalent policy regimes can immediately be identi…ed from
structural relations. For example, a constant money growth policy is equivalent to a passive
interest rate rule, while an active interest rate policy is equivalent to an accommodating
money growth policy, i.e., money growth rates rising with in‡ation.
When prices are sticky, the analysis of the structural relation between the policy in-
struments is, however, not su¢cient for the derivation of equivalence conditions. The fun-
damental solution is now history dependent for a money growth regime, where the central
bank adjusts money supply contingent on a predetermined stock of money. Further, given
that prices evolve sluggishly, real money becomes a relevant endogenous state variable in
this case. On the contrary, an interest rate policy, implemented in a non-backward looking
way, leads to a fundamental solution, which lacks any history dependence. In order to be
equivalent to a money growth rule, interest rate policy must therefore feature a backward
looking element, which is, for example, also recommended for optimal interest rate policy
(see Woodford, 2000). Speci…cally, equivalence requires interest rate setting to depend on
lagged values of real balances or of output, whereas interest rate smoothing is insu¢cient
for this purpose. These results are demonstrated to be robust with regard to changes in
the money demand speci…cation as long as households are purely forward looking. When,
on the other hand, households’ behavior is history dependent in the sense that it relies on
beginning-of-period real balances,5 non-backward looking interest rate policy can in fact
be equivalent to money growth policy. Under equivalence, however, interest rate rule co-
e¢cients are not in general associated with positive values. Moreover, a non-destabilizing
money growth policy is incompatible with the Taylor-principle, as the latter, which ensures
bubble-freeness for a forward looking consumption path (see Woodford, 2001), violates the
requirements for saddle path stability in a history dependent environment.6 Accordingly,
the Taylor (1993) rule cannot mimic Friedman’s k-percent money growth rule.
The remainder is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a standard cash-in-
advance model. Section 3 presents equivalence conditions for ‡exible and sticky prices. In
section 4 we examine alternative money demand speci…cations including the original Clower
(1967) constraint and the money-in-the-utility-function approach. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section presents a cash-in-advance model with staggered price setting, featuring the
main ingredients of standard New Keynesian models, i.e., a consumption Euler equation
5In this case the main characteristics of the model and the results are comparable to those in Vegh (2001).
6The determinacy properties for interest rate policy are comparable to those in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2001), where di¤erent speci…cations for money in the utility function are considered. In our paper changes
in the saddle path stability conditions are due to changes in the state space dimension, whereas their results
rely on ’di¤erent pricing equations for the nominal interest rate’ induced by changes in the timing of markets.
2(the ’forward looking IS-curve’), a forward looking aggregate supply constraint (the ’New
Keynesian Phillips curve’), and a simple monetary policy rule.
Households Throughout the paper nominal (real) variables are denoted by upper-case
(lower-case) letters. There is a continuum of identical and in…nitely lived households of
measure one. The objective of a representative household is given by:
1 X
t=0
¯tU (ct;l t); with ¯ 2 (0;1),( 1 )
where c denotes consumption, l working time, and ¯ t h es u b j e c t i v ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r . T h e
instantaneous utility function U (ct;l t) is assumed to be strictly increasing in c,d e c r e a s -
ing in l, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and to satisfy the usual Inada
conditions. To obtain a consumption Euler equation, which leads to the so-called ’forward
looking IS curve’, we further assume that U (ct;l t) is separable: U (ct;l t)=u(ct) ¡ v(lt).
At the beginning of each period households are endowed with money Mt¡1 and risk-
free government bonds Bt¡1. Before households enter the goods market in period t,t h e y
are not able to adjust their assets’ holdings such that they rely on their predetermined
asset holdings Mt¡1 and Bt¡1. After the goods market is closed, they decide on how to
adjust their …nancial assets Mt and Bt. While government bonds earn a nominal interest,
itBt¡1, money serves as a means of payment. In particular, consumption expenditures are
restricted by the following cash constraint:
Ptct · Mt¡1 + Pt¿t; (2)
where P denotes the aggregate price level. According to the cash constraint (2) consumption
expenditures are restricted by the after tax money holdings.7 The government transfer
Pt¿t will rise with the seignorage such that a monetary expansion eases the cash restriction
in equilibrium. Hence, this establishes a positive link between a monetary injection and
aggregate demand.8 The representative household further receives wage payments Ptwtlt
and …rms’ pro…ts !t such that the budget constraint reads
Ptct + Bt + Mt · (1 + it)Bt¡1 + Mt¡1 + Ptwtlt + Pt¿t + Pt!t: (3)
Maximizing the objective (1), subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (2) the budget
constraint (3), and a no-Ponzi-game condition, limi!1 (Bt+i + Mt+i)¦ i
v=1(1+it+v)¡1 ¸ 0,
for given initial values B0 and M0 leads to the following …rst order conditions:







7This speci…cation can, for example, be found in the textbook of Walsh (1998).
8Variations of the money demand speci…cation and their e¤ects on the conditions for policy equivalence
w i l lb ed i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n4 .
3and the cash constraint (2) with Ãt
¡
mt¡1¼¡1
t ¡ ct + ¿t
¢
=0and Ãt ¸ 0, where ¼ denotes
t h ei n ‡ a t i o nr a t e( ¼t ´ Pt=Pt¡1), m real balances (mt ´ Mt=Pt), ¸ the shadow price of
wealth, and Ã the Lagrange multiplier on the cash constraint. Furthermore, the budget
constraint (3) holds with equality and the transversality condition, limi!1 ¸t+i¯t+i(Bt+i+
Mt+i)=Pt+i =0 , must be satis…ed.
Production sector The …nal consumption good is an aggregate of di¤erentiated goods
produced by monopolistically competitive …rms indexed with i 2 (0;1). The CES aggre-






it di; with ²>1, where y is the
number of units of the …nal good, yi the amount produced by …rm i,a n d² the elasticity
of substitution. Let Pi and P denote the price of good i set by …rm i and the price index
for the …nal good. The demand for each di¤erentiated good is derived by minimizing the
total costs of obtaining y : yit =( Pit=Pt)




it di.A… r mi produces
good yi with the technology: yit = lit. Following Calvo (1983), …rms may reset their prices
with the probability 1¡Á independent of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The
fraction Á of …rms are assumed to adjust their previous period’s prices according to the
following simple rule: Pit = ¼Pit¡1; where ¼ denotes the average of the in‡ation rate. The
linear approximation to the aggregate supply constraint then reads (see Yun, 1996)
b ¼t = Âc mct + ¯b ¼t+1; with Â =( 1¡ Á)(1¡ ¯Á)Á¡1; (5)
where b x denotes the percent deviation of any variable xt from its steady state value x,
b x = log(xt)¡log(x),a n dmc the real marginal costs. Demand for aggregate labor input in
a symmetric equilibrium relates the real marginal costs to the real wage: mct = wt:
Public sector The public sector consists of a monetary and a …scal authority. The latter
is assumed to issue one-period bonds, while the former issues money. The consolidated ‡ow
budget constraint of the public sector is given by Bt+Mt =( 1 + it)Bt¡1+Mt¡1+Pt¿t. Public
policy is assumed to be Ricardian, i.e., to satisfy limi!1(Bt+i+Mt+i)¦i
v=1 (1 + it+v)
¡1 =0
(see Benhabib et al., 2001). The sequence for government bonds is further restricted, for
convenience, in that they are issued at a net supply equal to zero.9
The monetary authority either controls the nominal interest rate or the money growth
rate according to simple rules, encompassing rules commonly applied in the literature. In
the …rst case, it sets the money growth rate ¹t ´ Mt=Mt¡1 according to
mt¼t=mt¡1 = ¹t = ·¹¼
¹¼
t ; with ¹t ¸ 1,( 6 )
where the parameter ·¹ is assumed to satisfy ·¹ = ¼1¡¹¼,w i t h¼>¯ . Generalizing the
9The occurence of bonds in the consolidated cash constraint can alternatively be avoided by assuming
that only seignorage, Pt¿
s
t = Mt ¡Mt¡1, is transferred in form of cash such that Pt¿
s
t instead of Pt¿t enters
the right hand side of (2).
4case of a constant money growth policy (¹¼ =0 ), we allow the growth rate ¹t to depend
on the current realization of the in‡ation rate in order to facilitate a direct comparison
with common interest rate rules. Apparently, one would expect the parameter ¹¼ to be
non-positive for a central bank which aims at stabilizing in‡ation (see McCallum, 1999).
In the second case, the central bank is assumed to control the nominal interest rate
on government bonds. In particular, we allow the gross nominal rate R ´ 1+i to be set
contingent on a variety of indicators: Rt = ½(¼t;¼t+1;R t¡1;m t¡1),w i t hRt ¸ 1.T h i sf a i r l y
general policy rule is assumed to be consistent with the steady state for a money growth
policy, i.e., to satisfy the steady state condition ½ = ¼=¯ = ·
1=(1¡¹¼)
¹ =¯ for ½>1.
3 Relating interest rate to money growth policy
In this section, we aim at revealing conditions for money growth and interest rate policy
to lead to the same allocation. In particular, we de…ne policy regimes to be equivalent
when they are associated with the identical fundamental solution for the model’s perfect
foresight equilibrium. We choose this particular de…nition of equivalence provided that the
fundamental solution, which is also known as the bubble-free solution, satis…es commonly
used equilibrium selection devices. For example, the fundamental solution is identical with
the unique solution satisfying the criterium for saddle path stability, which is also applied
in this paper,10 and it satis…es McCallum’s (1983, 1999) minimum state variable crite-
rion.11 Hence, we abstain from considering non-fundamental solutions, i.e., solutions with
extraneous states, which would enlarge the set of policy rules with identical solutions.12
We restrict our attention to cases where the nominal interest rate is strictly larger than
zero, it > 0, such that the cash-in-advance constraint always binds. Before we turn to the –
probably more realistic – case where prices are set in a staggered way, we start with the case
where prices are ‡exible (Á =0 ). We will demonstrate for both cases how money growth
and interest rate policy are related to each other by deriving the requirements for simple
interest rate rules to implement the fundamental solution of the model’s perfect foresight
equilibrium for the money growth rule (6).
Flexible prices For the case where prices are ‡exible we assume, for convenience, that







1+#, where µ;#;¾ > 0. Collecting the equilibrium
conditions for ‡exible prices, (2), (4), (6), w = ²¡1
² ; (¹t ¡ 1)mt¼¡1
t = ¿t and ct = lt,a n d
reducing the model, a perfect foresight equilibrium can be de…ned as follows:13
10A model exhibits saddle path stability if the number of stable roots is equal to the number of predeter-
mined variables (see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).
11Gauthier (2003) further shows that the fundmental solution is also locally stable under learning.
12Non-fundamental solutions are known to allow for sunspot equilibria (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 2000).
13Explosive equilibrium paths are, apparently, not ruled out by the transversality condition, which can





5De…nition 1 (Flexible price equilibrium) A perfect foresight equilibrium of the ‡exible





t Rt =(² ¡ 1)=(²µ); (8)
mt =ct; (9)
the money growth rule (6), and the transversality condition, given an initial value M0.
Combining the equilibrium conditions (7)-(9) with the policy rule (6), the model can be
reduced to a forward looking di¤erence equation in real balances, mt = mt(mt+1), such that
the single predetermined variable, i.e., nominal balances Mt¡1, is irrelevant for equilibrium
determination. Hence, the fundamental solution exhibits no endogenous state variable
implying that a stable and bubble-free equilibrium path must be identical with the steady
state itself, satisfying ¹ = ¼ = ¯R and the long-run versions of (8) and (9). Examining
the di¤erence equation mt(mt+1) reveals that if ¾¡1
¾ <¹ ¼ < 1 or if 1+ 2
#¡¾ <¹ ¼ and
¾<# , the model is saddle path stable such that the fundamental solution is the unique
solution (see appendix 7.1). The consumption Euler equation (7) and the money demand
condition (9) deliver the following structural relation between money growth, in‡ation and




Given that the model exclusively consists of jump variables, equivalent policy regimes can
immediately be identi…ed by (10). The following proposition presents the equivalence con-
dition for a forward looking interest rate rule Rt = ·½ ¢ ¼
½¼
t+1, where the parameter ·½ is
assumed to satisfy ·½ = ¯¡1¼1¡½¼ to ensure consistency of the steady state.
Proposition 1 (Equivalence, Á =0 ) Suppose that the central bank sets the nominal in-
terest rate according to Rt = ·½ ¢¼
½¼
t+1. Then interest rate policy is equivalent to the money
growth policy (6) if and only if
½¼ =1+¾(¹¼ ¡ 1): (11)
Condition (11) reveals that a constant money growth policy is equivalent to a passive
interest rate policy (½¼ =1¡¾<1), which even features a non-positive in‡ation elasticity
for common degrees of risk aversion, ¾ ¸ 1.14 On the other hand, an active interest rate
policy (½¼ > 1), which is commonly recommended for macroeconomic stability (see Clarida
et al., 1999) and often examined in theoretical contributions (see, e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001,
or Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001), mimics an accommodating money growth policy (¹¼ > 1),
which allows for non-fundamental solutions and, thus, for sunspot equilibria. It should
14For an interest rate policy satisfying Rt = ·½ ¢ ¼
½¼
t+1 the model can be reduced to a di¤erence equation
in e ¼t =l o g¼t with the eigenvalue 1+( 1¡ ½¼)(¾ + #)=(¾½¼). Hence, a policy rule satisfying 0 <½ ¼ < 1 is
associated with equilibrium determinacy, which corresponds to Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (2001) result for a
money-in-the-utility-function model with a cash-in-advance timing.
6further be noted that the condition (11) also ensures equivalence for an interest rate rule
featuring current in‡ation, Rt = ·½ ¢ ¼
½¼
t , given that a stable and bubble-free equilibrium
path is equal to the steady state itself.
Sticky prices Turning to the sticky price case (Á>0), the model is log-linearized at the
steady state with a target in‡ation rate ¼ : ¼ ¸ ¯. Interest rate rules, which will only be
presented in a log-linear form, are assumed to be associated with the same steady state.
The perfect foresight equilibrium of the log-linear model is de…ned as follows:
De…nition 2 (Sticky price equilibrium) A perfect foresight equilibrium of the log-linear
approximation to the model at the steady state with sticky prices (Á>0) and Rt > 1 is a
set of sequences fb ¼t, b mt, b ct; b Rtg1
t=0 satisfying
¾b ct =¾b ct+1 ¡ b Rt + b ¼t+1; with ¾ ´¡ ucc(c)c=uc(c) > 0; (12)
b ¼t =¯b ¼t+1 + !b ct + Âb Rt; with ! ´ Â(# + ¾) and # ´ vll(l)l=vl(l) > 0; (13)
b mt =b ct; (14)
b mt = b mt¡1 ¡ b ¼t + ¹¼b ¼t; (15)
and the transversality condition, given an initial value for real balances m0 = M0=P0.
When prices are rigid beginning-of-period real balances b mt¡1, which is predetermined,
serves as an endogenous state. Hence, the equilibrium sequences of all endogenous variables
rely on the history of real balances. It should be noted that the equilibrium conditions (12)
and (13) di¤er from the prototype New Keynesian model in Clarida et al. (1999) just with
regard to the gross nominal interest rate entering the aggregate supply constraint (13).
However, all results summarized in the propositions of this paper are unchanged for the
conventional speci…cation b ¼t = ¯b ¼t+1 + !b ct.15
Given that the model exhibits one predetermined, b mt¡1, and one jump variable, b ¼t,
saddle path stability requires exactly one stable eigenvalue. Examining the characteristic
equation reveals that the model is saddle path stable if and only if ¹¼ <¹ ¼ < 1, where ¹¼
= ¡1 for # ¸ ¾ and ¹¼ =1¡ 2
1+¯+Â
Â(¾¡#) for #<¾(see appendix 7.2). Hence, equilibrium
determinacy is usually ensured by a constant money growth policy.16 If, on the other
hand, the central bank raises the money growth rate by more than one for one with a rise
in in‡ation (¹¼ > 1), sunspot equilibria or explosiveness cannot be ruled out. Provided
that the unique solution under ¹¼ <¹ ¼ < 1 is identical to the fundamental solution, the
characteristics of the latter are presented in the following lemma.
15The latter can, for example, be obtained when the cash constraint is modi…ed to Ptct · Mt¡1+Ptwt(lt¡
Lt)+Pt¿t,w h e r eLt denotes aggregate labor input. This speci…cation, which can be found in Jeanne (1998),
avoids the cash-credit distortion between consumption an leisure.
16For #<¾the lower bound ¹¼ takes extremely small (negative) values for reasonable parameter values.
I tc a ne a s i l yb es h o w nt h a t¹¼ always equals ¡1 for the conventional aggregate supply constraint.
7Lemma 1 (Fundamental solution) The fundamental solution of the sticky price model
given in de…nition 2 satis…es
b mt = b ct = ±mb mt¡1, b ¼t = ±¼mb mt¡1, b Rt = ±¼mb mt¡1; (16)
with ±¼m ´ (1 ¡ ±m)=(1 ¡ ¹¼) > 0; and ±rm ´ (1 + ¾ (¹¼ ¡ 1))±m±¼m;
The eigenvalue ±m satis…es 0 <± m < 1 if the model is saddle path stable, ¹¼ <¹ ¼ < 1.
Proof: See appendix 7:3.
As stated in the last part of lemma 1, saddle path stability implies that the eigenvalue ±m lies
between zero and one. According to the solution for the stable eigenvalue (see appendix 7.3),
endogenous persistence rises with the in‡ation elasticity ¹¼. For example, applying standard
parameter values (¯ =0 :99, ¾ = # =2 , Á =0 :8), we obtain ±m =0 :60 for ¹¼ = ¡0:5,
±m =0 :65 for ¹¼ =0 ,a n d±m =0 :73 for ¹¼ =0 :5. Using the fundamental solution of
the model, one can easily derive conditions for policy equivalence. For this the structural
relation between money growth, in‡ation, and the interest rate, ¾b ¹t+1 = b Rt +(¾ ¡1)b ¼t+1,
is again employed, which can either be obtained from combining (12) and (14) or by log-
linearizing (10) at the steady state. In contrast to the ‡exible price case, the requirements
for equivalence cannot solely be inferred from this equation. As can be seen from de…nition
2, the equilibrium path is history dependent as monetary policy relies on beginning-of-
period real balances, b mt¡1. While this always applies for money growth policy, interest
rate policy induces the same history dependence if interest rate policy relies on lagged
values of real balances, b mt¡1. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 (Equivalence, Á>0) Suppose that the central bank sets the nominal in-
terest rate according to b Rt = ½¼b ¼t + ½mb mt¡1. Then interest rate policy is equivalent to the
money growth policy (15) if and only if
½m =[ ( 1+¾(¹¼ ¡ 1))±m ¡ ½¼](1¡ ±m)=(1 ¡ ¹¼),a n d½m 6=0 . (17)
Proof. Applying the state space solution form b mt = ±mb mt¡1 and b ¼t = ±¼mb mt¡1 for the
model (12)-(14) with an interest rate policy satisfying b Rt = ½¼b ¼t + ½mb mt¡1, leads to the
conditions (1 ¡ ¯±m ¡ Â½¼)±¼m = !±m + Â½m and (1 ¡ ±m)¾±m +½m =( ±m ¡ ½¼)±¼m for
the undetermined coe¢cients ±m and ±¼m. A comparison with the solution given in (6)
then reveals that the policy parameter ½¼ and ½m has to satisfy (17) in order to implement
the same fundamental solution as the money growth policy. As the fundamental solution
for interest rate policy exhibits coe¢cients on the endogenous state equal to zero (±m =
±¼m = ±rm =0 )f o r½m =0 , equivalence further requires ½m 6=0 . ¥
Given that the solution (16) implies b ¼t+1 = ±mb ¼t, an analogous equivalence condition can
immediately be derived for an interest rate rule featuring future in‡ation rates.17 According
17For a policy rule satisfying b Rt = ½¼b ¼t+1 + ½m b mt¡1 the equivalence condition (17) changes slightly
to: ½m =[ 1+¾(¹¼ ¡ 1) ¡ ½¼]±m(1 ¡ ±m)=(1 ¡ ¹¼) and ½m 6=0 .
8to proposition 2 equivalence requires the coe¢cient on real balances ½m to be non-positive
for reasonable parameter values and to decline with the in‡ation elasticity ½¼. For example,
using the parametrization from above equivalence demands: ½m = ¡0:35½¼¡0:23 for ¹¼ =0 ,
½m = ¡0:27½¼ ¡ 0:32 for ¹¼ = ¡0:5,a n d½m = ¡0:54½¼ for ¹¼ =0 :5. Condition (17),
together with the condition for saddle path stability, further has an important implication
for the set of interest rate sequences, which can be implemented by a money growth policy.
For example, a money growth rule aimed to mimic a simple active interest rate rule (½m =0 ,





=¾ > 1.S u c hav a l u ef o r¹¼, however,
violates the condition for saddle path stability. It implies that a higher in‡ation rate leads
to a rise in the growth rate of real balances, which further stimulates aggregate demand
feeding higher prices such that in‡ation expectations can be self-ful…lling. When prices
are extremely rigid, this mechanism can even lead to explosive paths.18 Hence, a sequence
of interest rates satisfying b Rt = ½¼b ¼t,w i t h½¼ > 1, which is often found to be associated
with equilibrium uniqueness for interest rate policy (see, e.g., Woodford, 2001),19 allows for
unstable or sunspot equilibria when the central bank sets the money growth rate.
According to the equivalence condition (17), an interest rate policy characterized by
½m =0) ½¼ =( 1 + ¾(¹¼ ¡ 1))±m is not equivalent to a money growth policy, even
though, it implies a sequence of constant money growth rates. In this case, the equilibrium
sequences are independent of the history of real balances implying that the fundamental
solution exhibits no relevant endogenous state (±m = ±¼m = ±rm =0 ). Thus, history
dependence of interest rate rules, which is also recommended for optimal interest rate
policy (see Woodford, 2000), is necessary for equivalence, whereas the in‡ation elasticity
can be equal to zero. Consider, for example, the lagged value of output, which enters the
optimal interest rate rule under commitment in the standard New Keynesian model (see
Clarida et al., 1999), as an alternative interest rate rule argument. Replacing real balances
by output in the policy rule, b Rt = ½yb yt¡1 + ½¼b ¼t, again leads to equivalence for (17) with
½y = ½m,g i v e nt h a tb yt = b mt holds. However, at least one coe¢cient, ½y or ½¼,o fa n
interest rate rule, which is equivalent to a constant money growth policy, is non-positive
for reasonable degrees of risk aversion, ¾ ¸ 1. We can further conclude, using b yt = ±mb yt¡1,
that a money growth policy cannot implement an interest rate sequence satisfying Taylor’s
(1993) rule on a saddle stable equilibrium path, while Friedman’s k-percent rule is for ¾ ¸ 1
even incompatible with the so-called Taylor-principle (see Woodford, 2001).20
18It can be shown that an in‡ation elasticity satisfying ¹¼ > 1 leads to explosiveness if Â<1 ¡ ¯.
19For our model the determinacy condition for b Rt = ½¼b ¼t reads:1<½ ¼ < 1+( #=¾)+( 1¡ ¯)=Â,w h i c h
is related to Carltrom and Fuerst’s (2001) result for sticky prices. The derivation of this condition can be
found in Brueckner and Schabert (2003) for a sticky price model with working capital exhibiting a reduced
and log-linearized form, which is isomorphic to the model, (12) and (13), given in de…nition 2.
20As de…ned by Woodford (2001), the Taylor-principle demands ½¼ + ·½y0 > 1 for a policy rule b Rt =
½y0b yt + ½¼b ¼t, where the parameter · is strictly positive and de…ned by · ´ (1 ¡ ¯)=! > 0.
9It should further be noted that interest rate smoothing, where lagged values of the
interest rate are included in the policy rule, b Rt = ½b Rt¡1 + ½¼b ¼t, does not facilitate equiva-
lence. With a non-zero coe¢cient on past interest rates, interest rate policy can certainly
induce any degree of history dependence, including an eigenvalue ±r ´ b Rt=b Rt¡1 equal to
±m. However, the policy rule parameters ½ and ½¼ c a n n o tb es e ti naw a yt h a tr e p r o d u c e s
all structural relations between in‡ation, real balances and the interest rate implied by the
solution (16) for a money growth regime (see appendix 7.4).21
4 Alternative money demand speci…cations
In this section we consider two variations of the cash-constraint, before we brie‡y examine
the case where money demand is induced by assuming that money enters the utility function.
Including net bonds trading Though, the notion of a ’cash-in-advance’ constraint
seems to be unambiguous, the literature has employed a variety of speci…cations, which
depart from the original Clower (1967) constraint, including the version presented in (2).
An alternative speci…cation, which is for example applied in Lucas and Stokey (1987), is
Ptct · Mt¡1+RtBt¡1+Bt+Pt¿t. Allowing net bonds trading to ease the cash constraint can
be rationalized by assuming that the bonds market opens before the goods market is closed
(see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001). While the consolidated cash constraint still reads ct = mt
in an equilibrium with it > 0, the model changes with regard to the consumption Euler
equation (7), which now features the future interest rate Rt+1 :( ct+1=ct)
¾ = ¯Rt+1=¼t+1.
Hence, the structural relation between the money growth rate and the nominal interest
rate becomes: ¯Rt+1¼¾¡1
t+1 = ¹¾
t+1. Regarding the issue of equivalence this modi…cation has
only minor consequences. While the equivalence condition for ‡exible prices in proposition
1 remains unchanged, it changes slightly when prices are sticky.22 Hence, including net
bonds trading in the cash constraint does not alter the main conclusions.
History dependent households In contrast, the results in the previous section are
considerably altered when transfers are omitted from the cash constraint providing the
original Clower (1967) constraint: Ptct · Mt¡1.23 It implies that current consumption can
only respond to shocks via changes in the price level, and leads to the following equilibrium
condition: ct = mt¡1¼¡1
t . While the change in the cash restriction leaves the equivalence
condition for the ‡exible price model una¤ected, it has substantial consequences when prices
are sticky. Replacing the cash restriction (14) in de…nition 2 by
b ct = b mt¡1 ¡ b ¼t; (18)
21The reason is that the fundamental solution now features the lagged nominal interest rate as the single
endogenous state variable, which implies that the remaining coe¢cients of the fundamental solution are only
indirectly a¤ected by ½ and ½¼ via their impact on the eigenvalue ±r(½;½¼).
22The equivalence condition is now given by ½m =[ ( 1+¾(¹¼ ¡ 1)) ¡ ½¼](1 ¡ ±m)=(1 ¡ ¹¼) and ½m 6=0 .
23This speci…cation can, for example, also be found in the textbook of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996).
10causes the bubble-free equilibrium path to be history dependent regardless of the prevailing
policy regime.24 On the one hand, the perfect foresight equilibrium of the model for money
growth policy is again characterized by (16).25 On the other hand, the fundamental solution
for an interest rate policy now exhibits an endogenous state variable, i.e., real balances b mt¡1,
even for a non-backward looking policy rule. For example, it is shown in appendix 7.5 that
an interest rate rule solely featuring the current in‡ation rate b Rt = ½¼b ¼t is associated with
saddle path stability if interest rate policy is passive ½¼ < 1. In this case, the fundamental
solution is given by: b mt = ±mb mt¡1, b ct =( 1¡ ±¼m)b mt¡1; b ¼t = ±¼mb mt¡1,w i t h0 <± m < 1
and ±¼m = !(1¡¯±m +! ¡Â½¼)¡1. Equivalence of money growth and interest rate policy
can then be established in the following way.
Proposition 3 Suppose that consumption expenditures are restricted by Ptct · Mt¡1.A n
interest rate rule b Rt = ½¼b ¼t is then equivalent to a money growth policy (15) if and only if
½¼ =( 1¡ ¾)±m + ¾¹¼: (19)
Proof. Replacing consumption in (12) with the cash constraint (18) gives: b Rt = ¾b ¹t +
(1 ¡ ¾)b ¼t+1. For money growth policy, the fundamental solution for the nominal interest
rate, thus, reads: b Rt =[ ¾¹¼ +( 1¡ ¾)±m]±¼mb mt¡1. Reintroducing the current in‡ation
rate by its solution b ¼t = ±¼mb mt¡1 then leads to the equivalence condition (19). ¥
Hence, history dependence of households’ behavior allows simple interest rate rules to be
equivalent to a money growth policy. For example, condition (19) implies that the central
bank can for ¾ =1mimic a constant money growth policy by pegging the interest rate.
Money-in-the-utility-function At last we consider the widely used money-in-the-utility-
function approach to demonstrate the robustness of the main results. Speci…cally, suppose
that the utility function takes the form Um(ct;l t;a t)=U(ct;l t)+
°
1¡¾m(At=Pt)1¡¾m; with
°;¾m > 0.26 The relevant stock of nominal balances At either equals Beginning-of-period
money holdings At = Mt¡1 (version B)o rEnd-of-period money holdings At = Mt (version
E).27 The corresponding …rst order condition, which is given by
°m¡¾m
t = ¸t+1it+1 for version B; and °m¡¾m
t = ¸t+1it+1¯=¼t+1 for version E; (20)
reveals that households’ behavior does not depend on past realizations of real balances,
regardless whether beginning-of-period or end-of-period money holdings enter the utility
24This case, thus, accords to Vegh’s (2001) continuous time framework, where real balances are assumed
to be predetermined even for a forward looking interest rate policy.
25For su¢ciently rigid prices, Â<¯ = (¾ ¡ 1), the condition for saddle path stability is then given by
¡(Â#)
¡1 <¹ ¼ < 1, which ensures that the stable root lies between zero and one (see appendix 7.5).
26Empirical evidence, for example provided by Ireland (2003), indicates separability of the utility function
with regard to consumption and money to be a reasonable assumption.
27The latter is also called cash-when-I’m-done (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001).
11function. As in our benchmark case, the model exhibits an endogenous state variable only
if monetary policy is backward looking. The log-linearized version of (20) and the con-
sumption Euler equation,28 leads to the following structural relation between the nominal
interest rate, the money growth rate, and in‡ation
(R ¡ 1)
¡1 (Rb Rt ¡ b Rt+1) ¡ ¾mb ¹t =
(
b ¼t+1 ¡ ¾mb ¼t version B
2b ¼t+1 ¡ (¾m +1 )b ¼t version E
: (21)
The fact that money demand also depends on the nominal interest rate apparently makes
the problem more awkward.29 Nevertheless, equation (21) implies that the nominal interest
rate is in the long-run, i.e., after gradual adjustments are completed, related to the in‡ation
rate by 1+¾m (¹¼ ¡ 1), which corresponds to the relation in the benchmark model (see 11).
Further, equivalence in a sticky price environment still requires interest rate policy to depend
on lagged values of real balances. On the contrary, a B-version of a utility function Umn,
which is non-separable in consumption and real balances, leads to a …rst order condition
for consumption featuring beginning-of-period money holdings, ¸t = Umn
c (ct;m t¡1=¼t).
History dependence is then induced by the households’ behavior – as in the case of the
Clower (1967) constraint (see 18) – such that equivalence then becomes possible even for
non-backward looking interest rate rules.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have examined the relation between money growth and interest rate policy
in a standard business cycle model. When money demand increases with consumption,
the consumption Euler equation predicts that real balances rise with the real interest rate.
As a consequence, an active interest rate policy is associated with accommodating money
growth rates, while a constant money growth rule mimics a passive interest rate rule. When
prices are sticky, interest rate policy must further exhibit a backward looking component
to be able to implement the same fundamental solution as a money growth regime. While
the inclusion of lagged values of real balances or of output in an interest rate rule facili-
tates equivalence, interest rate smoothing is not su¢cient for this purpose. However, the
arguments of an interest rate rule, that is equivalent to Friedman’s k-percent rule, are in
general not associated with positive coe¢cients, which clearly runs counter to conventional
expectations about a monetary policy regime, which aims at targeting in‡ation. The re-
sults further suggest that Taylor’s (1993) rule cannot be interpreted as a description of
an interest rate sequence implemented by a non-destabilizing money growth policy, i.e., a
money growth regime satisfying the requirements for saddle path stability.
28Note that the consumption Euler equation, now reads ¾(b ct+1 ¡ b ct)=b Rt+1 ¡ b ¼t+1.
29In particular, the characteristic polynomial becomes cubic, as the interest rate now enters the structural
relation (21) with two di¤erent time indices.
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147 Appendix
7.1 Appendix to the ‡exible price model
Taking logs, the equilibrium conditions given in de…nition 1 can be written as ¾(e ct+1¡e ct)=
e ¯+ e Rt¡e ¼t+1; e ct = e mt; and e ct = ¡°1 e Rt+°2,w i t h°1 ´ (¾+#)¡1, °2 ´ g ²¡1
²µ (¾+#)¡1,w h e r e
e xt denotes the log of xt (e xt =l o gxt). Replacing the nominal interest rate and consumption
yields ¾e mt+1 = ¡#e mt ¡ e ¼t+1 + e ¯ + °2°¡1
1 . Combining the latter with the logged money
growth rule for period t +1 , e mt+1 = e mt +( ¹¼ ¡ 1)e ¼t+1 + f ·¹, then leads to the following
di¤erence equation in real balances
e mt+1 =( 1+°3) e mt + »,w i t h °3 ´ (1 ¡ ¹¼)(¾ + #)=[1 + ¾(¹¼ ¡ 1)]; (22)
and where » denotes a constant. Given that the endogenous variable can jump, uniqueness
requires the eigenvalue of (22) to be unstable, i.e., to lie outside the unit circle. Using
that °3 is strictly positive if and only if ¾¡1
¾ <¹ ¼ < 1,a n dt h a t°3 < ¡2 holds if and
only if ¾<#and 1+ 2
#¡¾ <¹ ¼, the model with ‡exible prices is uniquely determined if
¾¡1
¾ <¹ ¼ < 1 or if 1+ 2
#¡¾ <¹ ¼ for ¾<# .
7.2 Appendix to the sticky price model



















1 ¹¼ ¡ 1
!
; (23)
where ´ ´ ¯ + Â + Â¾¹¼ ¡ Â¾. The characteristic polynomial of M¡1
0 M1 is given by
F(X)=X2 +( ¡1+!¹¼ ¡ ! ¡ Â ¡ Â¾¹¼ + Â¾ ¡ ¯)´¡1X + ´¡1: (24)
The model exhibits exactly one predetermined variable such that stability and uniqueness
requires one stable and one unstable eigenvalue. To identify the conditions for saddle path
stability, we distinguish two cases. Consider …rst the case where ´>0 , 1 ¡
Â+¯
Â¾ <
¹¼.G i v e n t h a t F(X) exhibits a minimum and that F(0) = ´¡1 > 0, F0(0) = ¡[1 +
!(1 ¡ ¹¼)]´¡1 ¡ 1 < 0 and F(1) = !´¡1 (¹¼ ¡ 1), there is exactly one stable root, which
lies between zero and one if ¹¼ < 1. For the case 1 ¡
Â+¯
Â¾ >¹ ¼, which implies that
¹¼ < 1, F(0) < 0, F(1) > 0 and F0(0) > 0 holds, there is again exactly one root between
zero and one. In order to rule out equilibrium multiplicity, we further have to ensure that
F(¡1) = ¡2+[2+!(1¡¹¼)]´¡1 is not positive. While F(¡1) cannot be positive for # ¸ ¾
given that 1 ¡
Â+¯
Â¾ >¹ ¼, uniqueness additionally requires that 1 ¡
2¯+2+2Â
Â(¾¡#) <¹ ¼ < 1 for
#<¾ . Hence, the model is saddle path stable if ¹¼<¹ ¼ < 1, where ¹¼ is equal to ¡1 for
# ¸ ¾ or equal to 1 ¡ 2
1+¯+Â
Â(¾¡#) for #<¾ :
157.3 Proof of lemma 1
In order to establish the claims made in the lemma, the model given in de…nition 2 is solved
by applying the method of undetermined coe¢cients (see, e.g., McCallum, 1999) for the
solution form: b mt = b ct = ±m b mt¡1, b ¼t = ±¼mb mt¡1, b Rt = ±rmb mt¡1. Eliminating consumption
in (12) and (13) by (14) and replacing the endogenous variables in the equilibrium conditions
with the general solution form gives the following conditions for ±m and ±¼m :
±¼m =( 1¡ ±m)=(1 ¡ ¹¼);! ± m = ±¼m ¡ (¯ + Â¾(¹¼ ¡ 1) + Â)±¼m±m: (25)
Eliminating the coe¢cient ±¼m in (25) leads to a quadratic equation in ±m,w h i c he q u a l st h e
characteristic polynomial (24) in appendix 7.2. There it is shown that if the model is saddle
path stable, then the coe¢cient ±m, which equals the smaller root of (24), lies between zero
and one. Further applying the structural relation ¾b ¹t+1 = b Rt +(¾ ¡1)b ¼t+1 and the money
growth rule (14) gives b Rt =[ ¾¹¼ ¡(¾¡1)]b ¼t+1 and, thus, ±rm =[ 1+¾(¹¼ ¡ 1)]±¼m±m. ¥
7.4 Appendix to interest rate smoothing
To demonstrate that interest rate smoothing is insu¢cient to facilitate policy equivalence,
we apply the method of undetermined coe¢cients to derive the fundamental solution of the
sticky price model with a backward looking interest rate rule satisfying b Rt = ½b Rt¡1 +½¼b ¼t.
Replacing the endogenous variables therein and in the equilibrium conditions (12)-(14) with
the solution form b mt = ±mr b Rt¡1, b ¼t = ±¼r b Rt¡1,a n db Rt = ±r b Rt¡1 leads to the following
conditions for ±mr, ±¼r; and ±r :







For (26) to be identical to the fundamental solution for a money growth policy (16), the
following equalities must hold: ±r = ±m, ±mr = ±2
m=±rm,a n d±¼r = ±¼m±m=±rm.I n -
serting the latter equations into (26) leads to the following three conditions in ½ and
½¼ : ½¼±¼m±m±rm = ±m¡½, ±2





=(1 ¡ ¯±m). Hence, it follows immediately from the last two conditions,
which are not equivalent and independent of ½ and ½¼, that the set of values for ½ and ½¼
ensuring the equivalence to a money growth policy (15) is empty.
7.5 Appendix to history dependent households
In order to examine the conditions for saddle path stability when the original Clower (1967)
constraint is imposed, the model (12), (13), (15), and (18) is rewritten as (23) with
M0 =
Ã





¡! 1+! ¡ Â¾¹¼
1 ¹¼ ¡ 1
!
:
16The characteristic polynomial of M¡1
0 M1 is now given by F(X)=X2 ¡(! ¡Â¾ ¡Â¾¹¼ +
¯ +1+Â)(¯ + Â ¡ Â¾)
¡1 X ¡(Â¾¹¼ ¡ 1 ¡ !¹¼)(¯ + Â ¡ Â¾)
¡1 =0 . Suppose that prices
are reasonable rigid such that Â<
¯
¾¡1.T h e n F(0) =
1¡Â¾¹¼+!¹¼
¯¡Â¾+Â > 0 for ¹¼ > ¡1=Â#,
and F(1) = !
¹¼¡1
¯¡Â¾+Â < 0 for ¹¼ < 1, indicating that exactly one root lies between zero
and one if ¡1=Â# < ¹¼ < 1 given that prices are su¢ciently rigid, Â<
¯
¾¡1.
Replacing the money growth rule (15) by the interest rate rule b Rt = ½¼b ¼t the matrices








¡! 1+! ¡ Â½¼
¾½ ¼ ¡ ¾
!
:
The characteristic polynomial of M¡1
0 M1, which reads F(X)=X2 ¡ (! + ¾ ¡ ¾Â½¼ +
¾¯)(¾¯)¡1X+(!½¼ + ¾ ¡ ¾Â½¼)(¾¯)¡1, is characterized by F(0) = (Â#½¼ + ¾)=¯¾ and by
F(1) = !
¯¾ (½¼ ¡ 1). Hence, the model is saddle path stable if and only if ¡¾=Â# < ½¼ < 1.
In this case, F(0) > 0 and F(1) < 0 such that the stable eigenvalue lies between zero and
one. Regarding the fundamental solution, we thus know that 0 <± m < 1. Further, the
solution for the in‡ation rate, ±¼m = !=[(1 + ! ¡ Â½¼)¡¯±m], can immediately be obtained
from the aggregate supply constraint, which now reads (1 + ! ¡ Â½¼)b ¼t ¡¯b ¼t+1 = !b mt¡1.
17